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UNCITRAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL MEDIATION IN CHINA 
Anna K. C. Koo* 
I INTRODUCTION 
In less than four years and after only four sessions, the Working Group on 
Arbitration and Conciliation came up with the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Conciliation of 2002 (the 'Model Law'), relying 
primarily on the Conciliation Rules of 1980 (the 'Conciliation Rules'). The Model 
Law is the first of its kind to encourage the use of conciliation as a dispute 
settlement method for cross-border commercial transactions. It provides uniform 
rules for some procedural aspects of conciliation, with a view to enhancing 
predictability and certainty in the use of the process. It applies to a wide range of 
international commercial disputes. Such disputes may arise from any legal 
relationships of a commercial nature, whether contractual or not.1 They satisfy the 
requirement of internationality if the parties of a conciliation agreement have their 
places of business in different States at the conclusion of that agreement. In 
addition, it happens when the State, in which either a substantial part of the 
obligations of the commercial relationship is to be performed, or with which the 
subject matter of the dispute is most closely connected differs from the State in 
which the parties have their places of business.2 Furthermore, 'conciliation' does 
not merely refer to a directive, advisory form of mediation. It is an umbrella term 
for all procedures in which a third party assists the parties to settle a dispute 
  
*  Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong. 
1  Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law, A/RES/57/18 (2002) at art 1(1). 
2  At art 1(4). 
2  
without imposing a binding decision, including mediation, neutral evaluation, mini-
trial or similar proceedings.3  
Rather surprisingly, the Model Law inspired only 14 countries to enact or 
amend domestic legislation on mediation over the past decade.4 Such responses 
were hardly comparable to those of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration of 1985. Despite the fact that China, Fiji, India, Japan, 
Mexico, Singapore and Thailand participated in the drafting stage, none of the 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region have informed the UNCITRAL Secretariat of 
adopting statutes based on the principles of the Model Law thus far. On the other 
hand, both domestic and international mediation activities proliferated in this 
region. Disputants preferred modern sets of mediation rules developed by service 
providers or themselves instead of the Conciliation Rules. Governments endorsed 
the use of mediation as an adjunct to litigation and promulgated legislation specific 
to mediation without explicit reference to the Model Law. The key question, then, 
is whether the Conciliation Rules and the Model Law become obsolete or remain 
relevant in the Asia-Pacific context. This chapter identifies major challenges 
involved in international commercial mediation from the findings of three recent 
surveys. Focusing on mainland China and its two special administrative regions, it 
compares and explains the extent to which mediation rules and laws in these 
jurisdictions address the pressing issues of mediation. It argues that the policies 
underlying the UNCITRAL texts echo those of the Chinese regulatory and legal 
framework for international commercial mediation, but the Conciliation Rules and 
the Model Law face an urgent need for update if they intend to lead their 
harmonizing role in China.  
II CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
MEDIATION 
Whilst each case turns on its own facts, being transnational in nature adds 
complexity. An international case typically involves higher monetary value, greater 
number of participants, and differences in legal system, culture, language and time 
  
3  At art 1(3); United Nations, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation 
with Guide to Enactment and Use 2002, (United Nations Publication Sales No. E.05.V.4, New 
York 2004), at para 7.  
4  Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law, above n 1.  
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zone. The 2011 Fortune 1000 Corporate Counsel Survey, 5  sponsored by 
Scheinman Institute on Conflict Resolution of Cornell University, Straus Institute 
for Dispute Resolution of Pepperdine University and International Institute for 
Conflict Prevention & Resolution, painted a positive picture of disputants' 
preference for international commercial mediation. Out of the 368 completed 
questionnaires from general counsels of 1,000 largest American companies, 38.2 
per cent attempted alternative dispute resolution (the 'ADR') in all cases unless 
litigation was appropriate, up from 27 per cent on the part of the initiating parties 
and 25.2 per cent on the part of the defending parties in 1997. 0.6 per cent 
espoused an 'always litigate' posture, down from 11.1 per cent 14 years ago. The 
existence of an ADR clause in the contract between disputants constituted the most 
compelling reason for using ADR over litigation, followed by efficiency, cost-
effectiveness and parties' control over the process. Mediation prevailed over 
arbitration as the most popular ADR process for commercial disputes between 
2008 and 2010, as the latter generated awards that are hard to appeal, resulted in 
compromised outcomes, faced reluctance of the opposing party to participate, 
failed to address non-legal issues and hinged on the perceived competence of the 
neutrals. As high as 86.2 per cent of the respondents indicated a strong likelihood 
of taking part in mediation in the future.  
More recently, the 2013 Survey on Corporate Choices in International 
Arbitration,6 administered by School of International Arbitration of Queen Mary 
University of London with funding from PricewaterhouseCoopers, echoed. Based 
on 101 completed questionnaires from in-house counsels worldwide and 30 in-
depth interviews from selected respondents, mediation ranked third as the most 
preferred dispute resolution mechanism for cross-border disputes, following 
arbitration and litigation. However, a crucial caveat in this key finding was that 
direct negotiation or mediation settled 57 per cent of the transnational disputes, 
leaving about 32 per cent of the unsettled cases to proceed to arbitration or 
litigation. Respondents considered maintenance of ongoing business relationship as 
the most valued benefit of mediation. Whilst arbitration could achieve fairness 
  
5  Thomas J Stipanowich and J Ryan Lamare "Living with ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of 
Mediation, Arbitration, and Conflict Management in Fortune 1000 Corporations" (2014) 19 
Harvard Negotiation Law Review 1. 
6  PricewaterhouseCoopers, "Corporate Choices in International Arbitration: Industry Perspectives", 
<www.pwc.com/gx/en/arbitration-dispute-resolution/assets/pwc-international-arbitration-
study.pdf>. 
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between the parties, the process continued to be hampered by huge costs and 
substantial delays. 
It is also worth noting that positive attitudes towards mediation spread in the 
Asia-Pacific. The 2013 Survey on the Use of Mediation in the Asia Pacific 
Region,7 conducted by International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution 
with a General Electric Foundation grant, revealed that there was a slight 
preference for mediation over arbitration. 78 per cent of 122 respondents from 
corporations and law firms used mediation in the past three years. The major 
reasons for choosing this process overlapped partially with those identified in the 
2011 Fortune 1000 survey: cost-effectiveness, efficiency and flexibility. The 
survey also suggested the downside of the process: lack of a final and binding 
decision, non-binding process, unpredictable and unenforceable outcomes and sign 
of weakness.  
These empirical data pointed out that preserving relationships was the key 
motivation for planning for and engaging in international commercial mediation. 
Yet disputants encountered obstacles at each stage of the process. Firstly, there are 
limited sources for nomination of the neutral role. Most ADR clauses do not name 
a particular individual to be the mediator. Accurate and publicly accessible 
information about the experience of practitioners remains scarce. Therefore, most 
disputants relied upon their own previous experience or recommendations from 
well-established ADR service providers to select the right candidate.8 Secondly, 
disputants' expectations on the quality of mediators are at the high end of the scale. 
They insist upon experienced mediators, yet decry the lack of diversity within the 
international pool. Although many of them controlled the selection of mediators, 
they expressed reservation about the perceived performance of the appointees.9 
Thirdly, lingering concerns about the integrity of the process subsist. Largely they 
reiterate existing problems of unreasonable refusal to mediate, the lack of 
suspension of the limitation period for initiating court proceedings, the scope of 
confidentiality of information exchanged during mediation and the absence of 
enforcement mechanism for mediated settlements. Lastly, the practicing style of 
mediation is gloriously diverse. Mediators with background as lawyers or judges, 
who dominate the industry, did not conduct mediation based on a purely facilitative 
  
7  International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution, "Attitudes Toward ADR in the Asia-
Pacific Region: A CPR Survey", <www.cpradr.org/Portals/0/Asia-Pacific%20Survey.pdf>. 
8  Thomas J. Stipanowich and J Ryan Lamare, above n 5 at Table Q. 
9  Thomas J. Stipanowich and J Ryan Lamare, above n 5, at Table T. 
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model. They proffered evaluations of the factual and legal issues in the dispute, 
which had a direct bearing on the rate and scope of settlement.10  
III THE CHINESE RESPONSE 
Disputants are free to develop their own process rules in a comprehensive 
mediation agreement to resolve most of the above issues. Alternatively, some 
relied upon the updated, tried-and-true mediation rules of global service providers, 
such as the International Chamber of Commerce (the 'ICC'), International Centre 
for Dispute Resolution (the 'ICDR') and World Intellectual Property Organization 
(the 'WIPO').11 In China, regionally based institutions played a substantial role in 
the landscape of international commercial mediation. The mediation rules of the 
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade/China Chamber of 
International Commerce Mediation Center (the 'CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Center'), 
Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (the 'HKIAC') and China Chamber of 
International Commerce-World Trade Center Macau Conciliation Centre (the 
'CCOIC-WTCM Conciliation Center')12 represent the dominant procedures in the 
mainland, Hong Kong and Macao respectively. The conduct of international 
commercial mediation is further subject to domestic legislation. Hong Kong is the 
only place in China that has a uniform law of mediation.13 The mainland adopts a 
piecemeal approach to mediation law. Separate statutes govern judicial, 14 
community, 15  administrative 16  and labor 17  mediations. None applies solely to 
  
10  Thomas J. Stipanowich and J Ryan Lamare, above n 5, at 62. 
11  International Chamber of Commerce Mediation Rules 2014 (the 'ICC Mediation Rules'); 
International Centre for Dispute Resolution International Mediation Rules 2014 (the 'ICDR 
International Mediation Rules'); World Intellectual Property Organization Mediation Rules 2014 
(the 'WIPO Mediation Rules').  
12  China Council for the Promotion of International Trade/China Chamber of International 
Commerce Mediation Center Mediation Rules 2005; Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre 
Mediation Rules 1999; China Chamber of International Commerce-World Trade Center Macau 
Conciliation Centre Conciliation Services Rules 2003. 
13  CAP 620 Mediation Ordinance 2013 (Hong Kong). 
14  Civil Procedure Law 2013 (People's Republic of China), ch 8. 
15  People's Mediation Law 2011 (People's Republic of China); Regulation on the Organization of 
the People's Mediation Committees 1989 (People's Republic of China); Some Provisions 
Concerning the Work of the People's Mediation 2002 (People's Republic of China). 
6  
commercial mediation, but the Civil Procedure Law becomes relevant if parties to 
a commercial dispute initiate court proceedings. Macao has not yet enacted any.  
These rules and laws do not restrict their applicability to local cases. Nor do they 
contain any provision that in principle would be unsuitable for international cases. 
A thematic analysis of the Chinese mediation rules and laws reveals that they 
address certain pressing issues of international commercial mediation with some 
striking similarities and considerable differences, as elaborated in the discussion 
that follows.  
A Commencement of Mediation 
The Chinese mediation rules adopt an opt-in procedure for the commencement 
of mediation. Articles 13 and 14 of the CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules provide 
that the party requesting mediation should submit a written application to the 
mediation center, which will forward a copy to the other party. The respondent 
should confirm its agreement to mediate within 15 days from the date of receiving 
the request. Articles 9 and 10 of the CCOIC-WTCM Conciliation Services Rules 
are essentially the same as the mainland counterpart, except the respondent has 30 
days to accept mediation. Articles 3 and 4 of the HKIAC Mediation Rules require 
the initiating party to serve a written notice to both the mediation center and the 
other party, and the latter has 14 days to reply. The invitation to mediate is deemed 
rejected if the requesting party receives no reply after the specified time limit has 
lapsed.18 In essence, mediation commences only with the consent of all parties, 
which reflects the principle of voluntary participation.19  
B Appointment of the Mediator 
The Chinese mediation rules respect party self-determination in the appointment 
of the mediator. Articles 13(3), 14, 16, 17(a) and 17(b) of the CCPIT/CCOIC 
  
16  Administrative Litigation Law of the People's Republic of China 2014 (People's Republic of 
China); Regulation on the Implementation of the Administrative Reconsideration Law of the 
People's Republic of China 2007 (People's Republic of China). 
17  Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China 2008 (People's 
Republic of China). 
18  CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules 2005 (People's Republic of China), art 15; HKIAC Mediation 
Rules 1999 (Hong Kong), art 4; CCOIC-WTCM Conciliation Services Rules 2003(Macau), art 
11.  
19  CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules 2005 (People's Republic of China) art 4; HKIAC Mediation 
Rules 1999 (Hong Kong), art 1; CCOIC-WTCM Conciliation Services Rules 2003 (Macau), art 5.  
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Mediation Rules and articles 9(3), 10 and 12 of the CCOIC-WTCM Conciliation 
Services Rules require each party, in its written invitation or acceptance of 
mediation, to appoint one mediator from the center's panel of mediators or 
authorize the center to do so unless otherwise agreed. The HKIAC Mediation Rules 
do not prefer co-mediation. Article 3(a) asks the initiating party to nominate a 
mediator or mediators thought suitable. Article 4 demands the respondent to 
indicate whether any mediator nominated is acceptable. A critical and practical 
question is what will happen when disputants cannot agree on the choice of the 
mediator. The CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Center and the HKIAC will act as the 
designating authority if the parties fail to agree on the choice of the mediator(s).20 
The CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Center may even exercise the discretion to appoint 
a presiding mediator if it believes that would be beneficial to the process.21 The 
CCOIC-WTCM Conciliation Center fails to bridge this gap. It intervenes only if 
the parties agree to have a sole mediator but cannot decide on whom.22 
A notable exception of party self-determination in choosing mediators appears 
in judicial mediation in mainland China. Article 94 of the Civil Procedure Law 
confers power on a single judge or judicial panel to mediate. The appointment of 
judge-mediators is still within the solid grasp of the judiciary, which manifests the 
exercise of judicial power in judicial mediation23 and reflects the traditional respect 
for persons in authority over professionals. The general prohibition of trial judges 
to mediate their own cases, unless with the consent of the parties,24 is a significant 
step to remove the danger of bias, though an increased involvement of professional 
mediators and mediation service providers25 to co-mediate26 would be much more 
effective.  
  
20  CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules 2005 (People's Republic of China), art 19(b); HKIAC Mediation 
Rules 1999 (Hong Kong) art 5. 
21  CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules 2005 (People's Republic of China), arts 17(c) and 19(a).  
22  CCOIC-WTCM Conciliation Services Rules 2003 (Macau), art 12. 
23  Several Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Further Implementing the Work Principle of 
'Giving Priority to Mediation and Combining Mediation with Judgment' 2010 (People's Republic 
of China), art 2. 
24  Several Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Establishing a Sound Conflict and Dispute 
Resolution Mechanism that Connects Litigation and Non-litigation 2009 (People's Republic of 
China), art 16. 
25  Civil Procedure Law 2013 (People's Republic of China), art 95. 
8  
C Venue of Mediation 
The Chinese mediation rules leave it up to the parties to choose the mediation 
venue. The HKIAC Mediation Rules exhibit the highest degree of party self-
determination. Article 24 of the CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules and article 13 of 
the CCOIC-WTCM Conciliation Services Rules refer to their own premises as an 
alternative. Article 94 of the mainland's Civil Procedure Law states that generally 
judicial mediation takes place in the court, unless otherwise agreed by the parties.27  
D Principles of Mediation 
The Chinese mediation rules and laws are unanimous about the principle of 
voluntariness. Articles 4 and 28(4) of the CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules, articles 
1 and 11(c) of the HKIAC Mediation Rules, articles 5 and 17(3) of the CCOIC-
WTCM Conciliation Services Rules and articles 9 and 93 of the mainland's Civil 
Procedure Law emphasize that disputants participate in and withdraw from the 
process on their own free will. The principle of self-determination also appears 
uncontroversial across the board. In addition to the selection of the mediator and 
mediation venue, disputants make free and informed choices as to outcome. Article 
5 of the CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules and article 6 of the CCOIC-WTCM 
Conciliation Services Rules state that the process relies on the parties to reach their 
own settlement agreement. Article 1 of the HKIAC Mediation Rules defines 
mediation as a non-binding dispute resolution process in which a neutral helps the 
parties to reach a negotiated settlement. Article 96 of the mainland's Civil 
Procedure Law provides that the parties, reach a mediated settlement on their own 
free, will and must not be forced to do so. Section 4(1) of Hong Kong's Mediation 
Ordinance clarifies that the mediator does not adjudicate a dispute or any aspect of 
it.  
E Role of the Mediator 
The rules and laws under study are, however, less unanimous about the neutral 
character of the mediator. Article 10 of the CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules, article 
7 of the CCOIC-WTCM Conciliation Services Rules, article 19 of the 2010 
  
26  Several Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Establishing a Sound Conflict and Dispute 
Resolution Mechanism that Connects Litigation and Non-litigation 2009 (People's Republic of 
China) art 16. 
27  Several Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Establishing a Sound Conflict and Dispute 
Resolution Mechanism that Connects Litigation and Non-litigation 2009 (People's Republic of 
China) art 16. 
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Opinion of mainland China's Supreme People's Court that interprets the Civil 
Procedure Law28 and sections 2 and 4(1) of Hong Kong's Mediation Ordinance 
require the mediator to be impartial, whereas article 6 of the HKIAC Mediation 
Rules focusses on disinterestedness in the outcome of mediation.29 Incidental to the 
principle of neutrality, article 21 of the CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules and article 
6 of the HKIAC Mediation Rules impose a duty on the mediator to disclose, prior 
to accepting an appointment, all actual and potential conflicts of interest that are 
reasonably known to the mediator and could reasonably be seen as raising a 
question about the mediator's neutrality. The latter goes on to say that the proposed 
mediator who has a conflict of interest cannot serve unless with the consent of all 
parties,30 which is consistent with the principle of self-determination. 
Being entrusted by the parties with the conduct of mediation, the mediator has a 
wide discretion to perform his or her functions. Article 23 of the CCPIT/CCOIC 
Mediation Rules, articles 7 and 8 of the HKIAC Mediation Rules and articles 14, 
18 and 19 of the CCOIC-WTCM Conciliation Services Rules allow the mediator to 
take appropriate steps to ensure a quality process, such as the use of joint and 
separate meetings, encouragement of active participation, request for disclosure of 
information and controlling timeliness of mediation proceedings. However, article 
23(g) and (h) of the CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules goes further regarding the 
mediator's role in reaching a settlement. It permits the mediator to propose the 
terms of a possible settlement at any stage of the process, whilst the mainland and 
Hong Kong legislation refer to a less directive approach to mediation, requiring the 
  
28  Several Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Further Implementing the Work Principle of 
"Giving Priority to Mediation and Combining Mediation with Judgment" 2010 (People's Republic 
of China). 
29  Working Group on Mediation of the Department of Justice of the Government of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region, "The Hong Kong Mediation Code' art 9: "The Mediator shall be 
competent and knowledge in the process of mediation". 
30  Working Group on Mediation of the Department of Justice of the Government of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region, "The Hong Kong Mediation Code", art 2. 
10  
mediator to assist the parties to explore and generate options,31 and to reality test 
and draft settlement terms.32  
F Role of the Parties 
The Chinese mediation rules promote proactive participation of the parties, 
which is a corollary of the principle of self-determination. Article 30 of the 
CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules, article 9 of the HKIAC Mediation Rules and 
article 20 of the CCOIC-WTCM Conciliation Services Rules encourage disputants 
to cooperate with the mediator, so that the process will run smoothly and in a 
timely fashion. As negotiations proceed, the parties make decisions as to process 
and outcome. It would be practically impossible for the mediator to ensure that 
they make free and informed choices to reach each decision. Therefore, article 
23(e) of the CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules, article 10 of the HKIAC Mediation 
Rules and article 15 of the CCOIC-WTCM Conciliation Services Rules provide 
that the parties may be represented or assisted by experts of their choice, and that 
the mediator can draw the parties' attention to the importance of independent 
advice or opinion where appropriate. For avoidance of doubt, these mediation rules 
specify that the parties will bear the fees of the mediator and other professionals 
incurred in the process.33 
G Confidentiality  
The Chinese mediation rules and laws have provisions on certain aspects of 
confidentiality of mediation communications. As to non-disclosure, article 26 of 
the CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules states that settlement agreements and 
statements based on settlement agreements that the mediator prepares at the request 
of the parties will not be made public except for their implementation or 
enforcement. Article 19 of the 2009 Opinion of mainland China's Supreme People's 
Court that interprets the Civil Procedure Law34 imposes a duty on the mediators 
  
31  Mediation Ordinance (Cap 620) (Hong Kong), ss 2, 4(1).  
32  Civil Procedure Law 2013 (PRC) art 97; Several Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on 
Further Implementing the Work Principle of 'Giving Priority to Mediation and Combining 
Mediation with Judgment' 2010 (People's Republic of China), arts 16, 20.  
33  CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules 2005 (People's Republic of China), arts 25, 33; HKIAC 
Mediation Rules 1999 (Hong Kong), art 13; CCOIC-WTCM Conciliation Services Rules 
2003(Macau) arts 15, 23.  
34  Several Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Establishing a Sound Conflict and Dispute 
Resolution Mechanism that Connects Litigation and Non-litigation 2009 (PRC). 
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and administrators of the process not to disclose information relating to the 
mediation proceedings. Section 8 of Hong Kong's Mediation Ordinance provides 
that any person must not disclose a mediation communication except with leave of 
the court. Leave is, however, not required in seven instances: the consent of all 
parties to the mediation and the mediator is obtained; the content of the mediation 
communication is public information; the content of the mediation communication 
is subject to discovery in civil proceedings; the disclosure is necessary to prevent 
or minimize the danger of injury to a person or of serious harm to the well-being of 
a person under 18; the disclosure is made for research, evaluation or educational 
purposes; the disclosure is made for the purpose of seeking legal advice; and the 
disclosure is made in accordance with a requirement imposed by law. 35  The 
statutory protection for non-disclosure does not extend to mediation agreements 
and settlement agreements, which fall outside of the broad definition of mediation 
communication.36  
In regard to without prejudice privilege, article 12(i) of the HKIAC Mediation 
Rules renders inter-party communications made in aid of settlement both immune 
from disclosure and inadmissible in evidence. Section 9 of Hong Kong's Mediation 
Ordinance echoes that mediation communications are inadmissible evidence in 
subsequent proceedings unless with leave of the court. Judges retain a wide 
discretionary power to grant leave to admit in evidence what was said or done in 
mediation. They take into account factors including public interest,37 interests of 
the administration of justice38 and well-established exceptions of the common law 
without prejudice rule.39 As the without prejudice privilege has no place in the 
mainland's legal system, article 31 of the CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules merely 
prevents the use of settlement plans put forward, proposed, admitted or indicated to 
be acceptable by the parties or the mediator in the course of mediation as grounds 
for claim or defence in subsequent proceedings. Similarly, article 22 of the 
CCOIC-WTCM Conciliation Services Rules does not allow the parties to invoke 
  
35  Mediation Ordinance (Cap 620) (Hong Kong) s 8(2). 
36  Mediation Ordinance (Cap 620) (HK) s 2. 
37  Mediation Ordinance (Cap 620) (HK) s 10(2)(b). 
38  Mediation Ordinance (Cap 620) (HK) s 10(2)(b). 
39  Mediation Ordinance (Cap 620) (HK) s 10(2)(c). See also A. K. C. Koo, "Confidentiality of 
Mediation Communications" (30 Civil Justice Quarterly 192, 2011). 
12  
any mediation communications as the basis of claim or defence in post-mediation 
proceedings. Likewise, article 19 of the 2009 Opinion of mainland China's 
Supreme People's Court requires the parties not to adduce notes of and 
concessions, promises, views or proposals made in the process as evidence in 
related court proceedings, unless with all parties' consent, required by law, or for 
the protection of national, social or public interests or the legitimate rights and 
interests of a non-party in the court proceedings. 
H Enforceability of Settlement Agreement 
Among the three jurisdictions, mainland China offers a considerable incentive 
to mediate. Mediated settlements are not inferior to court judgments. Articles 234 
and 236 of the Civil Procedure Law provides that a party to a judicially mediated 
settlement may apply to the court for enforcement. For parties who reached a 
settlement at other mediation organizations, the parties may incorporate an 
arbitration clause in the settlement agreement, to appoint an arbitral tribunal for the 
specific purpose of issuing an award on agreed terms based on the settlement 
agreement. 40  Alternatively, they may make a joint application to the relevant 
people's court to confirm the validity of the settlement before invoking the 
enforcement procedure.41 The application can be made in writing or by parol.42 It 
requires the submission of a mediated settlement and an undertaking to the effect 
that the parties entered into the agreement voluntarily without malicious collusion 
or circumvention of the law and that the parties agreed to bear civil liabilities and 
other legal liabilities if the content of the agreement results in personal injuries.43 
The court will adopt a summary procedure to inquire about the parties' 
understanding of the content of the mediated settlement, their willingness to accept 
the respective contractual rights and duties, and their willingness to submit the 
agreement to the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of enforcement.44 It will 
assess the mediated settlement and will not declare it valid if any of the following 
situations applies: a mandatory provision of the law or administrative regulation is 
  
40  CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules 2005 (People's Republic of China), art 27. 
41  Several Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Establishing a Sound Conflict and Dispute 
Resolution Mechanism that Connects Litigation and Non-litigation 2009 (People's Republic of 
China), arts 20-22. 
42  At art 22. 
43  At art 22. 
44  At art 23. 
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violated; the national, social or public interests are infringed; the legitimate rights 
and interests of a non-party are harmed; the criminal liability of a party is involved; 
the terms of the mediated settlement are uncertain; the mediation organization or 
the mediator compelled parties to mediate or committed a serious breach of 
professional conduct; or other circumstances that the court thinks fit.45 In addition, 
the court will not validate the mediated settlement if it was made contrary to the 
intention of the parties, where conflict of interests arose in the mediation or where 
the mediation process was obviously unfair, unless the parties insist on validation 
with notice.46 The decision to confirm the validity of a mediated settlement is 
enforceable upon service on the parties.47 
I  Role of the Mediator in Subsequent Proceedings  
The Chinese mediation rules and laws are rather inconsistent as to the role of 
the mediator in subsequent proceedings. Article 21 of the CCOIC-WTCM 
Conciliation Services Rules allow the mediator to act as an arbitrator in case of an 
unsuccessful mediation. In an effort to uphold impartiality and maintain 
confidentiality of mediation communications, the mainland and Hong Kong 
counterparts go in the opposite direction. Article 29 of the CCPIT/CCOIC 
Mediation Rules states that the mediator will not act as an arbitrator if mediation 
fails. Article 14 of the HKIAC Mediation Rules requires an undertaking from the 
parties not to appoint the mediator as an adjudicator, arbitrator or representative, 
counsel or expert witness of any party in any subsequent adjudication, arbitration 
or judicial proceedings whether arising out of the mediation or any other dispute in 
connection with the same contract. Further, article 32 of the CCPIT/CCOIC 
Mediation Rules, article 14 of the HKIAC Mediation Rules and article 19 of the 
2009 Opinion of mainland China's Supreme People's Court provide that the 
mediator will not act as a witness in subsequent proceedings. 
IV INFLUENCE OF THE UNCITRAL TEXTS 
The above thematic analysis shows that the Chinese mediation rules and laws 
are largely the same in terms of commencement, voluntariness, self-determination 
as to process and outcome and responsibilities of the parties. These similarities 
support the unformulated policy consideration of keeping the parties' freedom of 
  
45  At art 24. 
46  At art 24.  
47  At art 25. 
14  
action intact at any stage of the process. Another policy consideration is to 
recognize and maintain the need for flexibility, which inadvertently leads to 
considerable differences in default appointment of the mediator, the role of the 
mediator, confidentiality of mediation communications, as well as enforcement of 
settlement agreement. Such regional resemblances and disparities call for 
modernization and harmonization, to reflect contemporary practice, reduce costs 
and efforts in modification when adopting the mediation rules in a dispute48 and 
position China as a favorable forum for international commercial mediation as a 
whole. As the policies underlying the Chinese mediation rules echo similar stances 
taken at the UNCITRAL and global mediation service providers,49 the Conciliation 
Rules and the Model Law have a potential for inspiring modernization and 
harmonization of international commercial mediation in the Chinese context, if the 
Working Group on Arbitration and Conciliation improves on areas that are long 
overdue, as highlighted in Table 1 and 2 and discussed below.  
  
48  CCPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules 2005 (People's Republic of China), art 3; HKIAC Mediation 
Rules 1999 (Hong Kong), art 2. 
49  Report of the Secretary-General: commentary on the revised draft of UNCITRAL Conciliation 
Rules, A/CN.9/180 (y 1980), at paras 14-17; United Nations, UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Conciliation with Guide to Enactment and Use 2002, (United Nations 
Publication Sales No. E.05.V.4, New York 2004) at para 7, 9; International Chamber of 
Commerce, International Chamber of Commerce Mediation Rules 2014, at preamble; 
International Centre for Dispute Resolution, International Mediation Rules 2014, at introduction.  
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Table 1. Comparison of Major Mediation Rules in China and UNCITRAL 
Conciliation Rules. 
 
CCPIT/CCIOC 
Mediation Rules 
(PRC) 
HKIAC 
Mediation Rules 
(HK) 
CCOIC-WTCM 
Conciliation 
Services Rules 
(Macao) 
UNCITRAL 
Conciliation Rules 
Commencement of 
mediation 
arts 13-15: opt-in; 15 
days to accept.  
arts 3-4: opt in; 14 
days to accept.  
arts 9-11: opt-in; 30 
days to accept.  
art 2: opt-in; 30 days 
to accept. 
Appointment of the 
mediator 
arts 13(3), 14, 16, 
17, 19: self-
determination; centre 
can act as 
designating 
authority.  
arts 3(a), 4-5: self-
determination; centre 
can act as 
designating 
authority.  
arts 9(3), 10, 12: 
self-determination; 
centre can act as 
designating authority 
if parties agree to 
appoint a sole 
mediator.  
art 4: self-
determination; 
appropriate institute 
can act as 
designating authority 
if parties agree.  
Venue of mediation art 24: at center, 
unless otherwise 
agreed. 
N.A. art 13: at center, 
unless otherwise 
agreed. 
art 9(2): self-
determination, 
failing which 
mediator decides. 
Principles of 
mediation 
arts 4-5, 28(4): 
voluntariness; self-
determination as to 
outcome.  
arts 1, 11(c): 
voluntariness; self-
determination as to 
outcome.  
arts 5-6, 17(3): 
voluntariness; self-
determination as to 
outcome.  
arts 2(2), 2(3), 7(1), 
15(c), 15(d): 
voluntariness; self-
determination as to 
outcome.  
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CCPIT/CCIOC 
Mediation Rules 
(PRC) 
HKIAC 
Mediation Rules 
(HK) 
CCOIC-WTCM 
Conciliation 
Services Rules 
(Macao) 
UNCITRAL 
Conciliation Rules 
Role of the mediator arts 5, 10, 21, 23 
(and art 1 of Code of 
Conduct for 
Mediators): be 
impartial, upright, 
knowledgeable and 
experienced; ensure 
a quality process 
including offering 
settlement terms; 
mediate according to 
contract, law, 
international practice 
and principles of 
objectivity, justice 
and fairness, as well 
as on the basis of 
ascertaining facts, 
distinguishing right 
from wrong, and 
determining 
liabilities. 
arts 6-8: be 
disinterested in 
outcome; ensure a 
quality process.  
arts 6-7, 14, 18-19: 
be impartial, 
upright, 
knowledgeable and 
experienced; ensure 
a quality process; 
mediate according to 
contract, law, 
international practice 
and principles of 
objectivity, justice 
and fairness, as well 
as on the basis of 
ascertaining facts, 
distinguishing right 
from wrong, and 
determining 
liabilities. 
arts 5, 7, 9(1), 10: be 
independent and 
impartial; ensure a 
quality process 
including offering 
settlement terms; 
mediate according to 
principles of 
objectivity, justice 
and fairness, rights 
and obligations of 
the parties and 
usages of the trade. 
Role of the parties arts 23(e), 25, 30, 
33: cooperate with 
mediator; consult 
relevant 
professionals; pay 
mediation and 
professional fees. 
arts 9-10, 13: 
cooperate with 
mediator; consult 
relevant 
professionals; pay 
mediation and 
professional fees. 
arts 15, 20, 23: 
cooperate with 
mediator; consult 
relevant 
professionals; pay 
mediation and 
professional fees. 
arts 6, 8, 11, 12, 17: 
cooperate with 
mediator; consult 
relevant 
professionals; pay 
mediation and 
professional fees. 
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CCPIT/CCIOC 
Mediation Rules 
(PRC) 
HKIAC 
Mediation Rules 
(HK) 
CCOIC-WTCM 
Conciliation 
Services Rules 
(Macao) 
UNCITRAL 
Conciliation Rules 
Non-disclosure of 
mediation 
communications 
art 26: applies to 
settlement agreement 
and statement 
prepared by the 
mediator based on 
settlement 
agreement, except 
for implementation 
or enforcement.  
N.A. N.A. arts 10, 14: applies 
in separate sessions; 
applies to all matters 
relating to mediation 
including settlement 
agreement; except 
for implementation 
or enforcement of 
settlement 
agreement.  
Without prejudice 
privilege of 
mediation 
communications 
art 31: applies to 
settlement plans or 
proposals put 
forward, proposed, 
admitted or indicated 
to be acceptable by 
the parties or the 
mediator; not to be 
used as grounds for 
claim or defense. 
art 12(i): applies to 
every document, 
communication or 
information 
disclosed, made or 
produced by any 
party for the purpose 
of or related to the 
mediation process, 
except for 
implementation or 
enforcement of 
settlement 
agreement; 
privileged and 
without prejudice.  
art 22: applies to any 
statements, views, 
opinions or 
proposals put 
forward, proposed, 
admitted or indicated 
to be acceptable by 
the parties or the 
mediator; not to be 
used as grounds for 
claim or defense.  
art 20: applies to 
views in respect of a 
possible settlement, 
admissions, 
mediator's settlement 
proposals and 
willingness to accept 
mediator's proposal; 
not to be relied on or 
introduced as 
evidence in 
subsequent 
proceedings.  
Enforceability of 
settlement agreement 
art 27: may include 
arbitration clause in 
settlement 
agreement. 
N.A. N.A. art 13(2): may 
include arbitration 
clause in settlement 
agreement. 
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CCPIT/CCIOC 
Mediation Rules 
(PRC) 
HKIAC 
Mediation Rules 
(HK) 
CCOIC-WTCM 
Conciliation 
Services Rules 
(Macao) 
UNCITRAL 
Conciliation Rules 
Role of the mediator 
in subsequent 
proceedings 
arts 29, 32: not act as 
arbitrator or witness. 
art 14: not act as 
adjudicator, 
arbitrator, 
representative, 
counsel or witness. 
art 21: may act as 
arbitrator. 
art 19: not act as 
arbitrator, 
representative, 
counsel or witness. 
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Table 2. Comparison of Mediation Law in China and UNCITRAL Model Law 
on International Commercial Conciliation. 
 Civil Procedure 
Law (PRC) 
Mediation 
Ordinance (HK) 
UNCITRAL Model 
Law on 
International 
Commercial 
Conciliation 
Commencement of mediation N.A.  N.A. art 4: opt-in; 30 days 
to accept. 
Appointment of the mediator arts 94-95: people's 
court appoints a 
judge or judicial 
panel and may enlist 
institutional help. 
N.A. art 5: self-
determination; 
appropriate institute 
can act as 
designating authority 
if parties agree.  
Venue of mediation art 94 (and art 16 
SPC Opinion 2009#): 
in people's court; 
outside of court if 
parties agree. 
s 5(1): at least 
partially in Hong 
Kong, as an element 
to trigger 
applicability of the 
legislation. 
N.A. 
Principles of mediation art 9, 93, 96: 
voluntariness; self-
determination as to 
outcome.  
s 4(1): self-
determination as to 
outcome. 
arts 1(3), 4(1), 11(c) 
and 11(d): 
voluntariness; self-
determination as to 
outcome.  
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 Civil Procedure 
Law (PRC) 
Mediation 
Ordinance (HK) 
UNCITRAL Model 
Law on 
International 
Commercial 
Conciliation 
Role of the mediator arts 9, 93, 97 (and 
arts 15-16, 19-20 
SPC Opinion 
2010*): be impartial; 
ensure a quality 
process including 
reality testing and 
drafting settlement 
terms; mediate 
according to law, 
principles of 
objectivity, justice 
and fairness, as well 
as distinguishing 
between right and 
wrong.  
ss 2, 4(1): be 
impartial; not 
adjudicate; ensure a 
quality process 
including identifying 
issues, exploring and 
generating options 
and encouraging 
communications.  
arts 5(4), 6-8: be 
independent and 
impartial; ensure a 
quality process 
including offering 
settlement terms. 
Role of the parties N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Non-disclosure of mediation 
communications 
N.A. But see art 19 
SPC Opinion 2009#: 
applies to 
information relating 
to mediation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
arts 2, 8(1)-(3), 
10(1): applies to 
communication 
made for the purpose 
or in the course of 
mediation, except 
agreement to 
mediate and 
mediated settlement, 
unless with consent, 
in public domain, 
subject to discovery, 
for prevention of 
personal injury or 
serious harm, for 
research, evaluation 
arts 8-9: applies in 
separate sessions; 
applies to all matters 
relating to 
mediation; except for 
implementation or 
enforcement of 
settlement 
agreement.  
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 Civil Procedure 
Law (PRC) 
Mediation 
Ordinance (HK) 
UNCITRAL Model 
Law on 
International 
Commercial 
Conciliation 
or education, for 
seeking legal advice, 
required by law, or 
with leave. 
Without prejudice privilege of 
mediation communications 
N.A. But see art 19 
SPC Opinion 2009#: 
applies to notes of 
the mediation 
proceedings, parties' 
concessions/promise
s, mediator's/parties' 
views/proposals; not 
to be adduced as 
evidence in related 
court proceedings 
unless with consent, 
required by law or 
for protection of 
national, social or 
public interests or 
the legitimate rights 
and interests of a 
non-party in court 
proceedings.  
arts 2, 9, 10(1): 
applies to mediation 
communication; 
inadmissible in any 
proceedings unless 
with leave. 
art 10: applies to 
invitation/willingnes
s to mediate, views 
in respect of a 
possible settlement, 
admissions, 
mediator's settlement 
proposals and 
willingness to accept 
mediator's proposal, 
documents prepared 
solely for mediation; 
not to be relied on or 
introduced as 
evidence in 
subsequent 
proceedings; not 
admissible as 
evidence in 
subsequent 
proceedings; unless 
required by law or 
for implementation 
or enforcement of 
settlement 
agreement. 
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 Civil Procedure 
Law (PRC) 
Mediation 
Ordinance (HK) 
UNCITRAL Model 
Law on 
International 
Commercial 
Conciliation 
Enforceability of settlement 
agreement 
arts 234, 236 (and 
arts 20-25 SPC 
Opinion 2009#): 
apply to the court for 
enforcement (for 
judicially mediated 
settlement); apply to 
the court for 
validation and 
enforcement (for 
settlement 
agreements reached 
at other 
organisations). 
N.A. art 14: binding and 
enforceable; up to 
States to impose 
enforcement 
mechanism. 
Role of the mediator in 
subsequent proceedings 
N.A. But see art 19 
SPC Opinion 2009#: 
not to act as witness.  
N.A. arts 10(1), (3), (4), 
12: not give 
testimony unless 
required by law or 
for implementation 
or enforcement of 
settlement 
agreement; not act as 
arbitrator unless 
agreed by parties. 
 # SPC Opinion 2009 
stands for Several 
Opinions of the 
Supreme People's 
Court on 
Establishing a Sound 
Conflict and Dispute 
Resolution 
Mechanism that 
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 Civil Procedure 
Law (PRC) 
Mediation 
Ordinance (HK) 
UNCITRAL Model 
Law on 
International 
Commercial 
Conciliation 
Connects Litigation 
and Non-litigation 
2009. 
* SPC Opinion 2010 
refers to Several 
Opinions of the 
Supreme People's 
Court on Further 
Implementing the 
Work Principle of 
'Giving Priority to 
Mediation and 
Combining 
Mediation with 
Judgment' 2010. 
A Case Management  
A mechanism to trigger the commencement of mediation is of utmost 
importance, since disputants generally name a service provider and refer to its 
process rules only in their contract.50 The Chinese opt-in procedure is consistent 
  
50  For example, model conciliation clause of UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules 1980: 'Where, in the 
event of a dispute arising out of or relating to this contract, the parties wish to seek an amicable 
settlement of that dispute by conciliation, the conciliation shall take place in accordance with the 
UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules as at present in force'; suggested mediation clause of Hong Kong 
International Arbitration Centre: 'Any dispute or difference arising out of or in connection with 
this contract shall first be referred to mediation at Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre 
(HKIAC) and in accordance with its then current Mediation Rules. If the mediation is abandoned 
by the mediator or is otherwise concluded without the dispute or difference being resolved, then 
such dispute or difference shall be referred to and determined by arbitration at HKIAC and in 
accordance with its Domestic Arbitration Rules' and recommended clause for domestic and 
international conciliation of the World Trade Center Macau: 'Any dispute, controversy or claim 
arising out of or relating to this contract, shall be settled by conciliation in Macao S.A.R. at 
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with article 2 of the Conciliation Rules and article 4 of the Model Law. Both 
UNCITRAL texts make it clear that mediation commences only if disputants agree 
to engage in the process within 30 days or any other specified period. The 
requesting party may revoke the invitation to mediate before its acceptance, as a 
corollary of the principle of voluntary withdrawal. 51  However, the responding 
party's option to refuse to mediate would defeat the purpose of any contractual 
agreement entered into before or after the dispute has arisen to engage in 
mediation. Whilst the sources of an obligation to mediate and consequences of 
non-compliance may depend on private contracts and national policies, 52  the 
UNCITRAL texts should not abstain from addressing this issue which is 
fundamental to achieving the objective of encouraging greater use of mediation and 
further subject to the parties' right to withdraw in the course of the process. 
Amendment is called for to the effect that acceptance is no longer required where 
disputants concluded an agreement to mediate. Mediation will commence when the 
initiating party's request reaches the named service provider and/or the responding 
party. Acceptance is necessary only in case of no pre-existing agreement. The ICC, 
ICDR and WIPO contributed to harmonization in this aspect in their respective 
mediation rules.53 
Appointing the mediator and fixing the mediation venue are crucial for the 
process to begin. Article 4 of the Conciliation Rules and article 5 of the Model Law 
encourage disputants to agree on the selection of the mediator, but require prior 
authorization from the parties before their named service provider can make a 
default appointment. The UNCITRAL can follow up in two directions. First, it 
could empower the parties' decision-making by requiring them to strike out 
unacceptable names on the recommendation list and priorities the remaining names 
in order of preference within a limited timeframe before a default appointment 
  
World Trade Center Macau Arbitration Center and in accordance with its Internal Regulations. If 
the said dispute, controversy or claim could not be resolved by conciliation, with the parties' will, 
it can be settled through the arbitration process'. 
51  Guide to Enactment and Use of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Conciliation 2002 para 44. 
52  UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation with Guide to Enactment and 
Use 2002, (United Nations Publication Sales No. E.05.V.4, New York 2004) at para 36, 43, 76.  
53  International Chamber of Commerce, Mediation Rules 201, at arts 2(1), (3), (5), 3(1), (3), (4); 
The International Centre for Dispute Resolution, International Mediation Rules 2014, at art 2; the 
WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, WIPO Mediation, Arbitration, Expedited Arbitration 
and Expert Determination Rules and Clauses 2014 at arts 2-4.  
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kicks in. 54 Secondly, it could remove the condition for default appointment of 
mediators. Appropriate service providers should be able to come to the rescue 
where the parties reach no consensus on the choice of the mediator.55 As to the 
place of mediation, the Model Law makes no mention of it, on the basis that an 
international commercial mediation can occur in several places in practice and 
hence it may appear somewhat artificial to designate the place of mediation as the 
primary basis for triggering the application of domestic legislation on mediation.56 
Hong Kong's Mediation Ordinance offers a solution to resolve this issue. It applies 
where, firstly, there is a written agreement to mediate and, secondly, either a 
mediation takes place at least partially in the city or the governing law clause in the 
written mediation agreement refers to the laws of Hong Kong or the Mediation 
Ordinance. 57  Even if the UNCITRAL rejects this approach, the mediator's 
determination of the mediation venue after consultation with the parties as 
provided in article 9(2) of the Conciliation Rules has its place in the Model Law, 
which is consistent with the general principles to promote active involvement and 
autonomy of the parties.  
B Functions of the Mediator and the Parties 
The neutral character of the mediator has different shades of meaning. Apart 
from being impartial and having no interest as to the outcome of the process, article 
7(1) of the Conciliation Rules and article 5(4) of the Model Law require the 
mediator to be independent. It is time for the UNCITRAL texts to formally 
recognise and clearly define these three distinct concepts of neutrality. Impartiality 
means freedom from favoritism, bias or prejudice.58 Impartial mediators conduct 
the process fairly and even-handedly as between parties.59 Disinterested mediators 
  
54  The International Centre for Dispute Resolution, International Mediation Rules 2014, at art 4(b).  
55  CPIT/CCOIC Mediation Rules 2005 (People's Republic of China), art 19(b); HKIAC Mediation 
Rules 1999 (Hong Kong), art 5.  
56  UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation with Guide to Enactment and 
Use 2002, (United Nations Publication Sales No. E.05.V.4, New York 2004) at para 30.  
57  CAP 620 Mediation Ordinance 2013 (Hong Kong) s 5(1).  
58  American Arbitration Association, American Bar Association and Association for Conflict 
Resolution, 'Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators 2005' at Standard II.  
59  Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation 2002, above n 1, at art 6(3); UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation with Guide to Enactment and Use 2002, 
above n 56, at para 55; Code of Practice for Civil and Commercial Mediation 2011, Law Society 
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do not have any significant personal or financial interest in the outcome of 
mediation.60 Independent mediators have no prior relationship with the parties and 
no allegiance to outside bodies interested in the result of mediation. Incidental to 
the principle of neutrality, article 5(5) of the Model Law imposes a duty on the 
mediator to disclose all actual and potential conflicts of interest that may raise a 
question about the mediator's neutrality. It extends the duty to disclose throughout 
the mediation proceedings. The UNCITRAL could also deal with conflict 
situations arisen subsequent to the process, such as the establishment of personal or 
professional relationship with the parties, other individuals or organizations 
involved in mediation.61 Further, articles 7(4) and 13(1) of the Conciliation Rules 
and article 6(4) of the Model Law permit the mediator to offer settlement proposals 
in the course of the process. Even if all parties agree that they would like the 
mediator to do so, there is a substantial risk in taking a proactive approach to 
settlement that the mediator may no longer appear to be impartial and disinterested 
as to outcome. A better course would be to empower the mediator to promote the 
settlement of the issues in dispute in any manner that he or she believes to be 
appropriate,62 while clarifying that the mediator cannot make a binding decision 
for63 or impose a settlement upon the parties.64  
On the other hand, the role of the parties is relatively unequivocal. Their right to 
engage in mediation voluntarily, terminate the process if they wish, and make free 
and informed decisions as to the outcome of the dispute find strong resonance in 
articles 2(2), 2(3), 7(1), 15(c) and 15(d) of the Conciliation Rules and articles 1(3), 
4(1), 11(c) and 11(d) of the Model Law. Their responsibilities to cooperate with the 
  
of England and Wales, s 3.2.2; The Hong Kong Mediation Code, Working Group on Mediation of 
the Department of Justice of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 
at arts 1 and 2. 
60  Code of Practice for Civil and Commercial Mediation, at s 3.2.1; The Hong Kong Mediation 
Code,Working Group on Mediation of the Department of Justice of the Government of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region, 'The Hong Kong Mediation Code', at art 1. 
61  Model Standards of Conduct for Mediator, American Arbitration Association, American Bar 
Association and Association for Conflict Resolution 2005, Standard III(A), (E), (F). 
62  WIPO Mediation, Arbitration, Expedited Arbitration and Expert Determination Rules and 
Clauses, above n53, at art 13(a). 
63  ICDR International Mediation Rules, above n 54, at introduction. 
64  UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 with Amendment as 
Adopted in 2006, A/61/453,at art 1(3); WIPO Mediation Rules, above n 53, art 13(a). 
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mediator and seek professional assistance are provided likewise in articles 6, 8, 11, 
12 and 17 of the Conciliation Rules.  
C Post-Mediation Issues 
The protection for confidentiality of mediation communications varies in three 
respects. Firstly, the subject matter may refer to all communications made for the 
purpose of or in the course of mediation, or a particular communication. Secondly, 
the duty may rest on the mediator and/or mediation participants. Thirdly, the 
prohibited use may include non-disclosure, without prejudice and/or 
inadmissibility as evidence in subsequent proceedings. The UNCITRAL texts 
provide the most comprehensive coverage. Article 10 of the Conciliation Rules and 
article 8 of the Model Law address the scenarios where a party gives information to 
the mediator subject to a specific condition that it be kept confidential.  In those 
circumstances, the mediator has a duty not to disclose that information to any other 
party to the process. Article 14 of the Conciliation Rules and article 9 of the Model 
Law extend the scope of non-disclosure to all mediation-related information. That 
is to say, information disclosed during mediation, the substance and the result of 
the process, as well as matters relating to mediation that occurred before the 
agreement to mediate was reached.65 Article 10 of the Model Law preserves the 
without prejudice nature of all information disclosed, made or produced for the 
purpose of or related to mediation, unless required under the law or for the purpose 
of implementation or enforcement of a settlement agreement.66 The scope of the 
without prejudice rule is sufficiently broad to cover the non-exhaustive list of 
mediation-related information including: invitation to mediate, willingness to 
mediate, admissions, views and suggestions of settlement proposals, willingness to 
settle and documents prepared solely for mediation.67 The without prejudice rule 
applies in all subsequent proceedings, whether related or unrelated to the subject 
  
65  United Nations, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation with Guide to 
Enactment and Use 2002, (United Nations Publication Sales No. E.05.V.4, New York 2004), at 
para 61. 
66  Above note 65, at art 10(1), (3); c.f. Conciliation Rules 1980 art 20; ICDR International 
Mediation Rules 2014, above n 54, art 10(3); WIPO Mediation Rules 2014, above n53, at art 17. 
67  UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 with Amendment as 
Adopted in 2006, above n 64, at art 10(1); Conciliation Rules 1980 art 20; ICDR International 
Mediation Rules 2014, above n 54, at art 10(3); WIPO Mediation Rules 2014, above n 62, art 17. 
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matter of mediation. 68 The mediator, the parties and any third person have an 
obligation not to rely on, introduce as evidence or testify as to all mediation-related 
information. 69  In addition, the court is required to treat such evidence 
inadmissible.70  
The neutral role of the mediator in subsequent proceedings is too important to 
ignore. Article 19 of the Conciliation Rules requires an undertaking from the 
parties and the mediator that the latter will not act as an arbitrator or representative, 
counsel or witness of any party in any subsequent arbitration or judicial 
proceedings in respect of a dispute that is the subject matter of mediation. The 
Model Law presents further refinements. Article 10(1), (3) and (4) prohibits the 
mediator from giving testimony in any subsequent proceedings, whether or not 
they are related to the dispute that is the subject matter of mediation. Article 12 
prevents the mediator from arbitrating disputes that arise from the same contract or 
legal relationship or any related contract or legal relationship. 
Finally, as a matter of general policy, the UNCITRAL promotes easy and fast 
enforcement of mediated settlement agreements. 71  However, article 14 of the 
Model Law only creates a contractual obligation binding on the parties to such 
settlement agreements and enforceable by State courts.  It is up to the States to 
adopt expedited enforcement mechanism or simplified procedures. Existing 
legislative solutions to this issue differ widely.72 Apart from relying on the contract 
law and invoking court enforcement, the law in other jurisdictions empower 
mediation parties to appoint an arbitral tribunal for the specific purpose of issuing 
  
68  UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 with Amendment as 
Adopted in 2006, above n 64, at art 10(4); Conciliation Rules 1980 art 20; ICDR International 
Mediation Rules 2014, above n 54, at art 10(3); WIPO Mediation Rules 2014, above n 62, art 17. 
69  UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 with Amendment as 
Adopted in 2006, above n 64, at art 20; Conciliation Rules 1980 art 20; ICDR International 
Mediation Rules 2014, above n 54, at art 10(3); WIPO Mediation Rules 2014, above n 62, art 17. 
70  UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 with Amendment as 
Adopted in 2006, above n 64, at art 10(3); Conciliation Rules 1980 art 20; ICDR International 
Mediation Rules 2014, above n 54, at art 10(3); WIPO Mediation Rules 2014, above n 62, art 17. 
71  Nations, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation with Guide to 
Enactment and Use 2002, above n3, at para 88. 
72  Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Enforceability of Settlement Agreements Resulting from 
International Commercial Conciliation/Mediation - Note by the Secretariat, 
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.187 (2014), at para 20.  
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an award on agreed terms based on the settlement agreement, or transpose a 
mediated settlement in the form of a notarial deed for enforcement of a specific 
court order. 73  In February 2015, the Working Group on Arbitration and 
Conciliation considered some legal and practical issues that could arise from a 
convention on enforcement of mediated settlement agreements and assessed the 
feasibility of preparing such an international instrument.74 Its recommendation to 
the UNCITRAL to request a broad mandate on this topic to take into account 
various approaches and concerns, identify relevant issues and develop possible 
solutions is encouraging, 75  as mediated settlements are perceived to be more 
difficult to enforce than arbitral awards and enforcement under contract law in 
other jurisdictions can be burdensome and time-consuming.76  
  
73  At paras 26-27.  
74  Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the Work of Its Sixty-Second 
Session, A/CN.9/832, (2015), at paras 17-56. 
75  At para 59. 
76  Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Enforceability of Settlement Agreements Resulting from 
International Commercial Conciliation/Mediation - Note by the Secretariat, above n72, para 2.  
